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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how people mobilize around notions of distributive 
justice, or “moral economies,” to make claims to resources, using the process of post-
socialist land privatization in the Mekong Delta region of southern Vietnam as a case 
study. First, I argue that the region’s history of settlement, production, and political 
struggle helped to entrench certain normative beliefs around land ownership, most 
notably in its population of middle peasants. I then detail the ways in which these 
middle peasants mobilized around notions of distributive justice to successfully press 
demands for land restitution in the late 1980s, drawing on Vietnamese newspapers and 
other sources to construct case studies of local land conflicts. Finally, I argue that the 
successful mobilization of middle peasants around such a moral economy has helped, 
over the past two decades, to facilitate the re-emergence of agrarian capitalism in the 
Mekong Delta, in contrast to other regions in Vietnam. 
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Introduction 
Over the summer and fall of 1988, the Mekong Delta region of southern Vietnam was 
rocked by protest and social conflict. In the face of new reform policies, which called 
for the re-establishment of private land use rights, the region’s middle peasants 
mobilized to demand the restitution of holdings that had been taken from them after 
reunification in 1975. These conflicts, which pitted middle peasants against both state 
actors and the rural poor, to whom their former property had been redistributed, were 
played out primarily on the local level in the form of land occupations, petition drives, 
and open protest at government offices. These forms of everyday protest, however, 
were remarkable both for the consistency with which middle peasant land claimants 
articulated their demands to land and alacrity with which these local conflicts were 
scaled up to the level of national politics, culminating in two marches on Ho Chi Minh 
City in August and November of 1988. In the end, this political mobilization by the 
Mekong Delta’s middle peasantry succeeded in achieving a special settlement of the 
land question, applicable only to that region, which allowed for the restitution of 
holdings to their former owners, and in turn prompted the dispossession and 
displacement of thousands of rural poor.  
This thesis seeks to explain why and how the Mekong Delta’s middle peasants 
were able to successfully mobilize around deep-seated and widely-shared notions of 
economic and distributive justice, or what I call a “moral economy,” to press for the 
restitution of their former holdings. In the thesis, I seek first to ground the 
development of this particular moral economy in the history of settlement, production, 
and political struggle in the Mekong Delta and second to show how the articulation of 
this moral economy has shaped not just the distribution of land, but the overall 
trajectory of economic and social development in the region. In doing so, I aim to fill a 
gap in the existing literature, providing a bridge between micro-level accounts of local 
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politics and macro-level accounts of political and economic change, both in the 
Mekong Delta and in Vietnam more broadly.  
 
The Micropolitics of Agrarian Transition 
Accounts of the micro-level, “everyday” politics of agricultural production and land 
allocation in northern Vietnam are relatively plentiful, with perhaps the most notable 
contribution being Benedict Kerkvliet’s (2005) masterful account of peasant resistance 
to collective agriculture in the Red River Delta, which spans the 1950s to 1980s. 
Peasant resistance, for Kerkvliet, is rooted in deeply-held “sentiments” on the part of 
the northern peasantry, who prefer family farming and individual ownership to the 
collectives, and who express these preferences through uncoordinated and often covert 
acts of sabotage, theft, and foot-dragging, eventually bringing down the collective 
system as whole. In a similar vein, those authors who have analyzed the local politics 
of decollectivization in northern Vietnam, such as Scott (2003), Sikor (2004), and 
Luong (2010), have frequently described how peasants mobilized around notions of 
distributive equity to affect the allocation of land to individual households. Hy Van 
Luong (2010:194), for example, recounts that a plan to allow better-off households in 
his Red River Delta study village to bid on more productive land was abandoned 
“under pressure” from local farmers, who demanded “more equality” in the allocation 
process, while Sikor (2004:182) describes how villagers in a northwestern village 
pressured cadres to enact an egalitarian redistribution more in keeping with their 
communitarian principles and traditional institutions.   
Unfortunately, little work has been done on the local politics of land in 
southern Vietnam, with the notable exception of Trung Dinh Dang’s recent Ph.D. 
dissertation (2007), which describes how farmers in Quang Nam and An Giang 
provinces resisted state attempts during the late 1970s and early 1980s to reorganize 
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production along socialist lines and redistribute land to the rural poor. His account, 
from which I draw extensively in this thesis, is remarkable not just in that southerners 
resisted collectivization, but that they, especially relatively prosperous middle peasants 
in the Mekong Delta province of An Giang, also resisted attempts to enforce a more 
egalitarian distribution of land, in sharp contrast to their northern counterparts. For all 
of its worth, however, Dang’s dissertation is neither concerned with the origins of this 
deeply rooted attachment to private property and antipathy to egalitarian 
redistribution, nor does he trace the ways in which it was manifested during the 
process of land privatization in the late 1980s or in the two decades of rapid 
agricultural commercialization which followed. 
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, the Mekong Delta emerged as a major 
producer of agricultural commodities for both export and domestic consumption, in 
sharp contrast to the more subsistence-oriented forms of production that continue to 
predominate in northern and central Vietnam; in recent years, the Mekong Delta has 
produced more than half of Vietnam’s total rice crop, and contributed more than 90% 
of rice exports (Nguyen Duy Can et al. 2007:72). While the rapid emergence of 
agrarian capitalism in the Mekong Delta has caught the attention of, among others, 
Haroon Akram-Lodhi (2005), his account of this process is curiously non-
contextualized, fixating not on the region’s geography, economic history, or political 
culture – nor on ways in which these factors shaped struggles around how resources 
would be allocated and production organized in the post-socialist period – but on the 
impersonal workings of the market. Market reforms, Akram-Lodhi argues, have 
placed “great pressure” on what was originally an “apparently equitable distribution of 
land,” leading “processes of social differentiation [to] assert themselves, and, perhaps, 
a form of ‘capitalism from below’ … to emerge” (2005:108). This analysis, however, 
fails to provide an explanation as to why market forces would assert themselves more 
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powerfully in the Mekong Delta than elsewhere, or what exactly it is about the region 
which has made it such fertile ground for the re-emergence of capitalist relations of 
production in agriculture. 
What this thesis does it to attempt to fill this analytical void through the use of 
moral economy as a theoretical frame, looking to historical patterns of settlement, 
relations of production, and experiences of political struggle to explain how and why 
the Mekong Delta’s middle peasantry mobilized around a particular set of claims and 
“moral arguments” during a key moment of political opportunity in the late 1980s. In 
doing so, I argue, the region’s middle peasants shaped both the way in which land was 
eventually allocated and, ultimately, facilitated the rapid emergence of a distinctly 
market-oriented agricultural sector in the post-reform period. In particular, I use the 
framework of moral economy to bridge the gap between political agency and 
subjectivity at the micro-level and macro-level structural change, looking at the ways 
in which notions of distributive justice take hold within certain historical and material 
conditions, how these normative attachments foster collective political action, and, 
ultimately, how they contribute to the establishment, maintenance, or upheaval of 
systems of property and production.  
 
Organization of the Thesis 
In the first section of the thesis, I survey the modern history of the Mekong Delta, 
tracing the origins both of the middle peasantry as a class and of this social 
formation’s distinct moral economy. In doing so, I pay particular attention to the 
region’s geography, economy, and history of political struggle over the course of the 
19th and 20th centuries. I argue that the Mekong Delta’s status as an agricultural 
frontier, the particular relations of production which predominated in the colonial and 
early republican periods, and the experience of political mobilization by insurgent and 
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state actors during the mid-to-late 20th century all helped to shape the middle 
peasantry’s notions of distributive justice and the arguments with which they were 
articulated.  
In the second section, I address the theoretical concepts of grievance and 
political opportunity, linking these concepts to the moral economy framework 
developed above. I first argue that the experience of land redistribution in the late 
1970s and 1980s, after the reunification of Vietnam under socialist control, sharply 
deviated from the “ideal” distribution of resources, as held by the middle peasantry. 
Second, I discuss the shifting opportunity structure which characterized the 
Vietnamese political system in the late 1980s, arguing that leadership changes at the 
upper echelons of the communist party, a food crisis in northern Vietnam, and the 
ambiguous policy environment during the early years of Doi Moi created a uniquely 
advantageous moment in which the middle peasants of the Mekong Delta could press 
their historical land claims and seek the redress of their perceived grievance.1  
In the third section, I discuss the protests that rocked the Mekong Delta during 
the late 1980s, drawing on contemporary Vietnamese newspapers and other secondary 
sources to construct a series of detailed case studies of local land conflicts. Through 
these case studies, I identify the key ways in which the moral economy of the middle 
peasants, and its attendant notions of distributive justice, were articulated in the 
context of social conflict. In particular, I discuss the ways in which notions of 
settlement and the frontier, appeals to productive capacity, and histories of 
revolutionary service were used to make claims land claims, both against the rural 
poor and against representatives of the local and national state.  
                                                 
1 Doi Moi, or “renovation,” refers to the series of market-oriented economic reforms implemented in 
Vietnam after the Sixth Party Congress in 1986.  
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In the fourth and final section, I describe the resolution and enduring legacy of 
these land conflicts and of the middle peasant moral economy around which they were 
articulated. What I argue is that the mobilization of the Mekong Delta’s middle 
peasants around this particular moral economy helped to shape the distribution of land 
and other productive resources in a way which ultimately favored the development of 
commercial agriculture (from a middle peasant base), resulting in the sharp divergence 
between that region’s political economy and that of Vietnam’s other agricultural 
regions, using the Red River Delta as a counterexample.  
 
Note on Sources 
Any attempt to tell the story of local land conflicts in Vietnam, especially those to 
which one was not a direct witness, is limited by the scope and biases of available 
sources. As with Kerkvliet’s study (2005) in the Red River Delta, I have attempted to 
reconstruct the political struggles over land that took place in the Mekong Delta during 
the late 1980s using contemporary newspaper accounts, in particular those of the Ho 
Chi Minh City-based Tuoi Tre and Thanh Nien. Despite a relative flourishing of press 
freedom in the late 1980s, all newspapers were (and remain) affiliated with the 
Vietnamese Communist Party or one of its subsidiary organizations, and thus tend to 
provide accounts favorable to the party and its policies. Given the ambiguity as to 
what exactly the “party line” was regarding middle peasant land claims during the 
period of study, and the relatively freedom with which such metropolitan newspapers 
criticized local and provincial officials, these tendencies do not, thankfully, prevent 
the available accounts from presenting a relatively informative – and relatively non-
propagandistic – account of local land disputes in the Mekong Delta. More serious as a 
methodological constraint, however, is the tendency of such sources to present the 
viewpoints of both middle peasant land claimants and local officials at length, while 
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not providing a similar treatment to those poor peasants who were threatened with the 
loss of their land. While I have, in the course of my research, recovered enough 
material to provide an adequate treatment of the middle peasantry and its particular 
moral economy, my treatment of the rural poor, and of the way in which they either 
contested or acceded to the claims of the middle peasantry, is much more tenuous, and 
is limited by the narrow scope of available secondary research.  
 
Moral Economy and Class Formation in the Mekong Delta  
As used here, moral is economy is not a theory unto itself, but is instead embedded 
within a larger, Marxian and materialist approach to political economy. Marx (1859) 
himself performed some of the earliest inquiry into political subjectivities and their 
relation to modes of production, famously arguing that “it is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness.” While such a phrasing implies that consciousness is merely an 
outgrowth of objective class position, his more detailed investigation into the political 
subjectivities of French peasants, as contained within The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Napoleon (1852), reveals a more nuanced appreciation for the specificity of 
historical context in shaping such subjectivities; the political orientation of the French 
peasantry, he argues, cannot simply be deduced from the contemporary class structure, 
but is instead conditioned by a submerged layer of custom and culture, by the 
“traditions of all dead generations,” which weigh “like a nightmare on the brains of the 
living.” 
Picking up where Marx left off, E.P. Thompson’s case study of bread riots in 
early modern England, contained within his 1971 essay on “The Moral Economy of 
the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century” and revisited in his book Customs in 
Common (1993), takes as its object of inquiry the political culture of the English 
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working class, including its “expectations, traditions” and even its “superstitions” 
(1993:260). What Thompson finds is that the bread riots of the 18th century formed a 
“pattern of social protest which derives from a consensus as to the moral economy of 
the commonweal” (1971:126); this “moral economy,” he argues, can be traced to an 
assemblage of beliefs, customs, norms, and practices around issues of distribution and 
surplus extraction, rooted in the history of pre-capitalist England and expectations of 
inter-class reciprocity.  
Building on Thompson’s contribution, I argue below that the particular moral 
economy of the Mekong Delta’s emergent middle peasantry was conditioned, first, by 
the human and physical geography of the delta, in particular by its pattern of 
settlement and by the persistence, into the 20th century, of an agricultural frontier; 
second, by the historical relations of agricultural production in the region and in 
particular by its dependence on a tenancy-based system of commercial rice cultivation 
during the French colonial period (1862-1954); and third, by the experience of 
political struggle during the middle and late 20th century, which helped to crystallize 
and articulate tenant land claims, leading eventually to a series of “land to the tiller” 
reforms which transformed tenants into middle peasant smallholders.  
 
Geographies of Settlement and Cultivation 
The moral economy which arose among the Mekong Delta’s peasants and tenant 
farmers was strongly shaped by the particularities of the region’s geography, its 
history and patterns of settlement, and in particular, by the existence and persistence of 
an agricultural frontier. Until the 17th century, the Mekong Delta was a sparsely 
inhabited region of swamps, forests, and inundated grasslands, politically integrated 
into the kingdom of Angkor and its successors in Cambodia. Over the course of the 
17th and 18th centuries, however, the Khmer were progressively displaced by ethnic 
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Vietnamese settlers from the north, culminating in the assertion of Vietnamese 
sovereignty over the region in 1802. This claim to sovereignty was in turn rooted in 
and justified by the application of labor in clearing and cultivating the “wild lands” 
(dat hoang) of the delta. In Vietnamese historiography, the conquest of the delta has 
been viewed as the “breaking of virgin soil” (khan hoang), implying that “the land had 
hitherto been unused and therefore available” and that “a degree of hard work (to 
make the land viable) had to be involved before a sense of ownership could be 
conferred” (Ang forthcoming).  
The settler society which sprung up along the frontier, however, differed 
significantly from that of the Vietnamese homeland to the north. While the villages of 
northern and central Vietnam, where land was scarce and no equivalent agricultural 
frontier existed, had long managed such scarcity by designating large swathes of cong 
dien, or communal land, for periodic redistribution to the landless, this pattern was not 
replicated in the Mekong Delta.2 Nor for that matter, did villagers in the Mekong 
Delta cluster in closed, corporate villagers, as did their counterparts in the north, but 
instead dispersed into more atomized settlements, usually strung along waterways 
(Rambo 1973). Such differences in the mode of settlement and land allocation led to 
the emergence of very different concepts of property in the Mekong Delta; while 
villagers in the north gained access to land (as common patrimony) through 
membership in a village community, their counterparts in the Mekong Delta were not 
granted land, but settled and cleared it themselves, and thus their right to access and 
use was rooted in the application of labor. 
With the establishment, in 1862, of a colonial protectorate in southern 
Vietnam, dubbed “Cochinchina” by the French, came a massive extension of canals 
                                                 
2 Pierre Gourou (1955:385), writing in the early 1930s, puts the figure for communal land at about 20% 
of total land area in the Red River Delta, while Hickey (1964:42), citing French colonial sources, puts 
that figure at only 3% for southern Vietnam and the Mekong Delta. 
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and other forms of infrastructure in the Mekong Delta, all with the aim of opening up 
the region for rice cultivation. To encourage the rapid conversion of existing land to 
export agriculture, the French also established a concession system which allowed for 
large land grants to elites, both Vietnamese and Western. These individuals, however, 
did “not to go out and do the actual hard work of clearing the land” themselves; 
instead, the “commonest pattern of acquiring land for the relatively well-to-do and 
powerful was to take it away from those who were unable to defend their own” (Gran 
1975:266-267). Taking advantage of a judicial system heavily weighted towards elite 
interests, they would simply file a claim to land that had been cleared, but whose 
settlers, largely illiterate and ignorant of the workings of French law, possessed no 
legal title.  
In most cases, the original settlers of such lands would become tenants under 
the concessionaires, many of whom held hundreds to thousands of hectares and who 
did not actively engage in any aspect of production, but rather hired managers to 
collect rents on their behalf. Facing expropriation and the crushing burdens of tenancy 
which then ensued, thousands instead sought a marginally better existence along the 
agricultural frontier to the west and south, where the gradual creep of French 
canalization projects and waterworks opened an ever greater swath of wilderness up to 
agricultural cultivation, and where unsettled and unregistered land existed into the 
1940s (Gran 1975:314). Here as well, however, they fell prey to land speculators and 
rent-seeking elites. A common practice was for speculators to pick out an uncleared 
area, file a demand for concession with the local courts, and simply wait for settlers to 
come, clear the land, and bring it under cultivation. Only then, as Gran (1975:314) 
notes, would the speculator act on his claim. 
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Relations of Production 
Given the concept’s lineage in Marxian political economy, the development and 
articulation of a particular moral economy only makes sense when situated, to use the 
phrasing of Robert Brenner (1976:31), within the historical “social-property relations” 
by which “a part of the product is extracted from the direct producers by a class of 
non-producers” and which thus form the primary axis of inter-class tension within a 
given society and a given mode of production. As theorized by Wendy Wolford 
(2005:243) in her work on agrarian social mobilization and competing claims to land 
among Brazilian agriculturalists, moral economy thus consists of “moral arguments,” 
constituted through “historically and culturally specific production relations,” and 
“used by a particular group of people to define the optimal organization of society, 
including most importantly an outline of how society's productive resources (in this 
case, land) ought to be divided.” 
In the colonial Mekong Delta, a capitalist mode of agricultural production was 
built around social-property relations of tenancy and dispossession, which facilitated 
the extraction of surplus value but also fomented persistent social conflict around 
competing claims to land. The result of the French concession system was, by the 
early 20th century, to sever the vast majority of the Mekong Delta’s population from 
ownership over the means of production, compelling them to enter into exploitative 
relations of tenancy or wage labor. A 1930-1931 survey conducted by colonial 
officials (Murray 1980:429-439) depicts this highly fractured social landscape: on one 
hand, landless tenant farmers comprised about 75% of households in the Mekong 
Delta, while a “floating surplus population” of landless laborers circulated about the 
countryside according to the rhythms of the agricultural calendar; on the other, a tiny 
minority of landlords (about 2% of the population) owned the vast majority of the 
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agricultural land area, while a small class of independent peasant producers tilled the 
remainder.  
In the words of Jeffrey Paige (1975:319), the colonial capitalism of the 
Mekong Delta thus served to create “a stark two-class system in which peasant labor 
created the only form of wealth and landlords simply confiscated this wealth in the 
form of rent.” The power of the landlord class and their exploitation of the tenants 
were compounded by the fact that tenants also frequently rented the means of 
production from landlords (Murray 1980:433-434), and went into debt as a result, 
ultimately allowing the landlords to capture an even greater proportion of the 
agricultural surplus than through mere rents alone. Rendered dependent on landlords 
for access to the means of bare subsistence and social reproduction, the political 
demands of the tenant class came to fixate on the recovery of land rights, prompting a 
constant stream of disputes, and even outright violence, between settler-tenants and 
concessionaire landlords.  
These tendencies came to a head in the late 1920s and early 1930s, culminating 
in a series of peasant protests, and even outright rebellions, across the Mekong Delta. 
One notable instance of peasant unrest was the Ninh Thanh Loi uprising of 1927, 
which united dispossessed Khmer and Vietnamese farmers in an attack against local 
concessionaries, who had laid claim to lands they had cleared and settled (Brocheux 
1995:40; Biggs 2010:100-102). This uprising was followed in the 1930s by a wave of 
land occupations, through which tenant protestors appealed to the French colonial 
government to take ownership rights from landlords and transfer them back to peasant 
cultivators (Scott 1976:126-127; Murray 1980:465).  
Neither rooted in a longstanding history of paternalistic social relations nor 
constitutive of anything more than naked exploitation and surplus extraction, the 
tenancy system of the colonial Mekong Delta was subjected to near-constant 
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resistance from below. Such resistance both grew out of and helped to crystallize an 
emergent moral economy, set in contradistinction to French colonial law and the 
social-property system it enabled, which articulated a moral argument to property 
based on the application of labor in its clearance, settlement, and cultivation. Land, as 
a contemporary Vietnamese proverb put it, should rightly belong to he “who rubs it 
between his hands each season” (Pike 1966:276). 
 
Articulation in Resistance 
It is in moments of resistance and political mobilization that the “the outlines of a 
given moral economy are most easily visible” (Wolford 2005:243). The act or process 
of resistance thus serves to solidify or concretize a moral economy, bringing the 
unspoken assumptions of a normative order into the realm of political discourse. This 
is precisely what happened in the Mekong Delta over the tumultuous decades between 
the onset of the First Indochina War in 1945 and the conclusion of the Second 
Indochina War (the “Vietnam War”) in 1975, as the region’s tenants became a target 
for mobilization by political entrepreneurs in both revolutionary movements (namely 
the Viet Minh and the National Liberation Front) and, in the early 1970s, the 
government of South Vietnam. In doing so, both sides catered an ideological message 
to the local, socially-situated moral economy of the tenant, promising to redress the 
historical grievance of dispossession through land reforms.  
During the 1945-1954 struggle against the French, the communist-led Viet 
Minh initially encountered suspicion on the part of the tenants regarding its objectives 
and ideology. In the recollection of one former tenant, the people “didn’t like 
communism” and “were afraid because they heard that communism meant pooling all 
the property of the people in common,” which would mean that “the individual would 
lose all his personal property and his right to trade” (Elliott 2007:32). Instead of 
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calling for collective ownership, the Viet Minh instead positioned themselves as the 
protectors of the tenants’ property claims against the underhanded and acquisitive 
landlord class (Elliott 2007:33). Where the Viet Minh were able to achieve political 
control, they distributed land from absentee landlords and pro-French collaborators to 
tenant farmers, transforming the beneficiaries into “new” middle peasants (Elliott 
2007:67-69). After the end of hostilities in 1954 and the creation of an independent 
state in South Vietnam, led by the fiercely anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem, the 
distribution of land in the Mekong Delta reverted to the pre-war status quo.  
This dynamic of reform and reversal, however, helped fuel the emergence of a 
communist insurgency in the early 1960s, as the National Liberation Front (NLF) 
mobilized the region’s tenants around their historical land claims and their attachment 
to private property, both as a means of self-reproduction and an object of struggle. 
Much like the Viet Minh in the First Indochina War, however, the NLF did not 
espouse an explicitly egalitarian or collectivist ideology (Race 2010:125), nor did it 
challenge the right of rural Vietnamese to own and rent land (Pike 1966:279). Instead, 
territories under NLF control were subject to “land to the tiller” (nguoi cay co ruong) 
reforms which transformed former tenants into “de facto owners of the land they 
worked” (Paige 1975:317). These reforms resonated with local conceptions of “social 
justice,” offering tenants a means by which to ascend to the ranks of the middle 
peasantry through the acquisition of land ownership rights (Hunt 2008:42, 64). The 
effect of these reforms, however, was not to erase social differences, but to cement 
inequalities within the ranks of the former tenants. Not all tenants farmed equal plots, 
and since some had built up their tenancies over time to encompass up to 10 hectares, 
in the process achieving some measure of “political and social status” (Paige 
1975:311), these larger tenants stood to gain much more than did small tenants or 
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landless laborers from the “land to the tiller” reforms of the NLF, and thus comprised 
the backbone of the movement in the Mekong Delta (Wiegersma 1988:191). 
For most of the conflict, the South Vietnamese government reversed NLF 
reforms upon recapturing “liberated territories” and restored ownership rights to 
landlords (Hunt 2008:166). In 1970, however, the government of President Nguyen 
Van Thieu, with guidance from American experts, sought to undermine the appeal of 
its insurgent rival by launching a “land to the tiller” reform of its own, in the process 
extending and entrenching the legal claim of tenants to the land they farmed. Over the 
course of the early 1970s, the rights to some 1.1 million hectares were distributed to 
about 1 million households in southern Vietnam and the Mekong Delta, transforming 
them, in both practical and legal terms, into middle peasant smallholdings (Prosterman 
and Riedinger 1987:139).  
The aim of these American-backed reforms was clear: to create a new class of 
“entrepreneurial small farmers” in the Mekong Delta, who “embraced liberal ideas of 
political and economic freedom,” as well as to introduce “capitalist relations” in 
agriculture (Porter 1993:28, 60). The creation of a newly landed class of middle 
peasants also invoked cultural norms to expand and improve production, since 
ownership status carried with it “a social responsibility to invest more and try harder, 
because a higher standard of living is expected of an owner-cultivator than of a lowly 
tenant” (Callison 1983:164). In conjunction with the relative weakness of the NLF 
insurgency in the rural Mekong Delta after the 1968 Tet Offensive, the Saigon 
government’s reforms helped to tie these new middle peasants into deepened relations 
of commercialization and market dependence. Significantly, land reforms went hand-
in-hand with the introduction of Green Revolution technologies, such as mechanical 
inputs, fertilizers, pesticides, and high-yielding varieties of “miracle rice” (Callison 
1983). 
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The combined effect of political mobilization by both revolutionary and state 
actors was thus, by the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, to bring the distribution of 
land and the organization of production into closer alignment with the moral economy 
of the Mekong Delta’s former tenants, while at the same time transforming them into a 
class of landholding middle peasants who were deeply enmeshed in capitalist relations 
of agricultural production. For this reason, Elliott (2007:39) has characterized the 
communist insurgency as a “victim of its own success” in mobilizing tenants around a 
narrow vision of land reform rooted, as Hy Van Luong (1994:91) has noted, “in the 
premise of private ownership of land as a commodity, a premise constitutive of the 
capitalist mode of production that had been nurtured both through the French colonial 
incorporation of south Vietnam into the world market, and during the American war 
period.” Upon reunification in 1975, the central authorities Hanoi found themselves 
tasked with the nearly impossible task of incorporating into an existing socialist 
system a region organized around the property relations of capitalist agriculture, and in 
which the dominant social formation, the new middle peasants, saw the world through 
a normative lens sharply at odds with the egalitarian and collectivist ideology of the 
party-state, itself largely the product of the historical and cultural context of northern 
and central Vietnam.  
 
Grievance and Political Opportunity in the Post-War Period 
Moral economy, as it has been presented here, provides the subjective basis (derived 
from material histories of settlement, production, and political struggle) around which 
a group may mobilize and make claims to resources. Such mobilization, however, 
requires both an impetus, or a grievance which may be framed in a manner consonant 
with an existing set of values or principles, and whose redress requires collective 
action, as well as a moment of political opportunity in which such action may 
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plausibly succeed (Tarrow 1998). These dynamics are clearly on display in the tumult 
which characterized the post-war Mekong Delta.  
With the end of the war and the reunification of Vietnam under the control of 
the communist government in Hanoi, the Mekong Delta’s new middle peasants found 
that they were no longer the beneficiary, but now the target, of state land reforms, 
which prioritized their landholdings for redistribution to the poor and rural landless. 
This new policy, resting as it did on egalitarian principles alien to the moral economy 
of the delta’s middle peasantry, lit a flame of resentment which smoldered into the 
1980s. It was only, however, with the political and economic shifts of the late 1980s 
that this flame erupted into a conflagration of social unrest.  
 
Grievance 
The notion of grievance has a long history in the study of political mobilization, but it 
is James Scott’s (1976) study of peasant rebellions in Southeast Asia that first employs 
the concept in relation to the moral economy. In Scott’s conceptualization, peasants in 
colonial Southeast Asia engaged in open rebellion only when a certain moral 
economic threshold was crossed, or when the features of an actually-existing political, 
economic, or social system strayed too far from the ideal conception of a just 
distribution of assets, resources, and opportunities, or what he calls the peasant’s 
“notion of economic justice” (Scott 1976:3). While Scott’s “moral economy of the 
peasant” is a distinct form, one which emphasizes notions of distributive equity and 
subsistence security rather than claims to land as inviolable private property, his 
formulation bears considerable relevance to the case at hand.  
Shortly after establishing control over the region, the Hanoi government 
launched a new wave of land reforms – dubbed “adjustments,” or dieu chinh in 
Vietnamese – aimed at eliminating “vestiges of feudalism” and “exploitation on the 
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land” (Dang 2007:118). In practice, what this round of readjustment entailed was the 
confiscation of land from landlords, former allies of the Saigon regime, and from those 
who had fled abroad, as well as from churches and temples (Lam Quang Huyen 
1997:172). The limited nature of this reform, however, meant that a significant group 
of poor farmers with “no land or insufficient land” continued to live alongside the 
ranks of “rural capitalists and rich farmers” (Vu Oanh 1984:23). To redress these 
inequalities, the central government began a second wave of redistributive reforms in 
1982, the aim of which was to force upper middle peasant households to “cede back 
that quantity of land which exceeds their household labor capacity” (Vu Oanh 
1984:29) for redistribution to poor and landless households.  
In total, more than 500,000 hectares were redistributed between 1976 and 
1985, or about 25% of the total agricultural area in the Mekong Delta (Dang 
2007:252). According to Lam Quang Huyen (1997:174), some 30% of rural 
households in the region were forced to surrender land in this period, ranging from 
rich and upper middle peasants capable of producing significant agricultural surplus 
on their “excess” land to “normal” middle peasants who produced little or no such 
surplus. A further 30%, mainly poor peasants and landless laborers, received land, 
which was distributed on a per capita basis.3 As a result, inequalities in land 
ownership and landlessness decreased precipitously in the Mekong Delta by the mid-
1980s (Ngo Vinh Long 1993:183; Dao The Tuan 1997:166); the equalization process, 
moreover, was seen as a vital first step towards the eventual collectivization of 
agriculture, since each household would be able to enter into a cooperative on an equal 
footing (Quang Truong 1987:218-222).  
                                                 
3 Hy Van Luong (1994: 89) observes a similar ratio of contributors to beneficiaries in his study of 
Khanh Hau village in Long An province. There, 100 middle peasant households, or about 30% of the 
village population, were strongly “encouraged” by local authorities to donate 1 hectare each of 
“surplus” land to a further 100 landless and land-poor households. 
  19 
Despite efforts by the new authorities to gather households into cooperative 
enterprises and to develop an ideology of “sharing rice and clothing” (nhuong com se 
ao) which cut across former class lines, such attempts were continuously stymied by 
the persistence of peasant attachments to private property and market relations. In 
some cases, these extended to outright resistance to socialist reforms on the part of the 
middle peasantry. Farmers, for example, slaughtered buffalo and oxen (rather than 
turn them over to collectives), refused to harvest crops in time, destroyed fruit trees 
and rice fields, and sabotaged collectively owned machinery (Vo Nhan Tri 1990:79; 
Quang Truong 1987:267-268; Porter 1993:52-53). Some peasants even plotted 
assassinations of local officials, though such plots were generally disrupted before 
they reached fruition (Dang 2007:179; Luong 2003:7, 59). 
It was not just the middle peasants, however, who attached a high value to 
notions of private property. Some poor and landless peasants, for example, “refused to 
receive redistributed land,” claiming instead that it was “weird to take other people’s 
property” (Dang 2007:120). In the words of one poor peasant, “at the time of land 
readjustment, authorities offered me some land but I did not accept. I thought that if I 
had land being taken to give to others, I would feel sad” (Dang 2007:261). 
Contemporary Vietnamese sources attributed such resistance to the “individualist” 
tendencies of the Mekong Delta peasantry (Quang Truong 1987:269) or to an ideology 
“heavily influenced by capitalist and feudalist thoughts,” as one local cadre put it in an 
interview with Trung Dinh Dang (2007:120). What is clear, however, is that peasants 
in the Mekong Delta, both poor and non-poor, displayed strong normative attachments 
to notions of individual property and a deep-seated respect for ownership rights gained 
through a mix of revolutionary struggle and labor effort. 
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Political Opportunity  
Moving from such forms of small-scale, everyday resistance to the type of coordinated 
social action which might actually reverse the redistribution of land and restore 
ownership to the middle peasantry required, however, a moment of political 
opportunity. A confluence of circumstances in the late 1980s created such an 
opportunity, leading to an unprecedented opening for middle peasant mobilization 
within the normally rigid confines of Vietnam’s one-party system. This moment of 
opportunity was rooted in three convergent developments: first, an economic and food 
security crisis which created the conditions for economic experimentation and 
deviations from socialist orthodoxy; second, shifts in the leadership of the Vietnamese 
state and Communist Party, which brought to the helm a new generation of cadres who 
were both amenable to market reforms and sympathetic to the interests of the Mekong 
Delta’s middle peasants; and, third, an atmosphere of policy uncertainty which 
followed the announcement of Doi Moi reforms in the agricultural sector in early 
1988.   
By the mid-1980s, Vietnam was in the grip of a severe economic crisis. As the 
northern collectives collapsed from within and southern farmers fiercely resisted the 
Hanoi government’s attempts to extract an agricultural surplus, grain procurement 
dropped. In the mid-1980s, some 40% of the rural population in northern Vietnam 
faced routine hunger, and by 1988, food shortages in the north placed an estimated 9.3 
million people in danger of famine (Ngo Vinh Long 1993:976). Such conditions also 
raised the specter of political unrest; Kerkvliet (2005:208), for example, describes how 
hungry peasants in the Red River Delta province of Ha Nam Ninh province stormed 
warehouses and granaries in 1986. To make matters worse, economic and political 
turmoil among Vietnam’s benefactors in the Eastern Bloc brought drastic cuts in 
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foreign aid, forcing the communist leadership to look inward to resolve its growing 
food security crisis.  
The 1980s were also, however, a time of profound leadership shifts within the 
Vietnamese Communist Party, as a new generation of reformers began to replace the 
dying old guard of revolutionary leaders. These reformers, the most notable of whom 
were Nguyen Van Linh (who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party 
from 1986 to 1991) and Vo Van Kiet (Vietnam’s chief economic planner for most of 
the 1980s and its Prime Minister in 1988 and again between 1991 to 1997), looked to 
the market mechanism for solutions to the problems of persistent under-production 
and social unrest. Significantly, both Linh and Kiet had significant links to the south; 
the former was a northerner by birth but had served among the southern insurgents 
during the war, while the latter had been born and raised in the Mekong Delta 
province of Vinh Long.  
This cadre of reformists served, collectively, as the architects of a set of 
policies known as Doi Moi, or “renovation.” While the proceedings of the Sixth Party 
Congress in 1986 outlined the general thrust of Doi Moi and called special attention to 
the Mekong Delta as a region of untapped productive potential (Vo Tong Xuan 
1995:192), a specific plan for the decollectivization of agriculture was not unveiled 
until the spring of 1988, when the Politburo released a document known as 
“Resolution 10.” What this new policy document called for was the complete 
dismantling of the agricultural collectives where they existed and for the allocation of 
land to individual households for private farming. Households would then receive 
long-term land use rights for these parcels, with the duration of those rights ranging 
from 10 to 20 years (Pingali and Xuan 1992:707). 
What Resolution 10 did not provide, however, was set of specific guidelines as 
to how land was to be reallocated. That is, it neither called for the formalization of the 
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currently existing, and largely egalitarian, distribution of land in the Mekong Delta nor 
outlined an alternative mechanism by which land rights were to be assigned; instead, it 
relegated such decisions to the provincial and sub-provincial authorities (FBIS 
5/18/1988). This uncertainty, in turn, created a moment of political opportunity readily 
seized upon by the middle peasantry, who took to the fields and streets of southern 
Vietnam to demand the return of their lost holdings. 
 
Case Studies: The Politics of Land Privatization  
To an extent and scale never before seen in post-war Vietnam, middle peasant 
protestors engaged, over the summer and fall of 1988, in open, organized, and vocal 
acts of contentious politics, ranging from petition drives to direct confrontations with 
government officials, all with the aim of recovering lost holdings.4 In total, at least 
200,000 petitions were lodged with the central government, with the largest number of 
petitions coming from the Mekong Delta provinces of An Giang, Dong Thap, and 
Minh Hai (JPRS 4/15/1992). In many cases, farmers marched on government offices 
at the provincial, district, and commune levels to demand the restitution of their old 
land (Thayer 1992:354); in Hau Giang province, for example, protestors from Vinh 
Chau and Thanh Tri districts came to Can Tho, the provincial capital, to submit 
petitions on land disputes in the summer of 1988 (BHG 8/10/1988), and farmers in 
Cuu Long province are reported to have marched on the provincial capital of Vinh 
Long to protest injustices in the allocation of land on October 11th (Hiebert 1989:19). 
In many other cases, former owners simply re-occupied disputed plots and forcibly 
displaced their current inhabitants.  
                                                 
4 As Trung Dinh Dang (2007:316-317) points out, there were also many cases of corrupt local cadres 
who had used the land redistribution process to appropriate land for themselves and their families; thus, 
an additional and overlapping set of social conflicts in the late 1980s pitted middle peasants against the 
local party cadres now occupying their former plots. 
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Using a mix of newspaper accounts and secondary sources, I have constructed 
below a series of case studies which illustrate the ways in which these middle peasant 
protestors drew upon and articulated a particular moral economy of property in order 
to press claims against the state and other social actors, including the rural poor now 
occupying their former holdings. Though these accounts differ in their particularities, 
they are linked, first, by the interlocking arguments which middle peasant protestors 
draw upon to make claims to property, as those interviewed or cited frequently link 
land claims to notions of cultivation, diligence, and hard work. Some, for example, 
cite the poor productive capacity of the land’s current occupiers as justification for 
their displacement, while others point to the wetlands of the western frontier, arguing 
that the landless should not take what belongs to others when they can still settle and 
clear such “wild” lands. Other middle peasant land claimants, meanwhile, engage in 
the symbolic clearance and cultivation of disputed plots to shore up their claims. In 
addition, these same middle peasant land claimants frequently invoke their 
revolutionary service and labor in the pursuit of land claims, emphasizing the 
historical link between the land reforms of the NLF and the class aspirations of the 
“new” middle peasants. In some cases, protestors sometimes went so far as to brandish 
war medals as they marched on government buildings (Thayer 1992). 
Common themes also emerge in the way in which others responded to these 
claims, often echoing or acceding to the normative concepts articulated by the middle 
peasants. First, though sources tell of conflict between middle peasant land claimants 
and the current occupiers of disputed parcels – namely poor and formerly landless 
peasants – there is also evidence that some of those who lost or stood to lose their land 
acknowledged the legitimacy of middle peasant land claims and willingly vacated 
plots out of deference to shared notions of justice or propriety. Second, those local 
officials who were called on to mediate land disputes often came down on the side of 
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middle peasants, in the process articulating a reformist, pro-market discourse which 
explicitly linked land ownership with the capacity of farmers to engage in “commodity 
production” (san xuat hang hoa) (FBIS 11/15/1988).  
 
Example 1: Tien Giang Province (Source: Agence France-Presse via FBIS) 
In a story carried by the AFP in November of 1988, a farmer in Tien Giang 
province by the name of Chu Duc Danh is interviewed by journalist Jean-
Claude Chapon (FBIS 11/25/1988). Before 1975, Chu Duc Danh was 
relatively affluent, owning nine hectares of agricultural land. With the coming 
of communist rule in 1975, he distributed seven hectares to his children, 
keeping two for himself. In 1983, the local government took one hectare and 
distributed it to a landless household. In the summer of 1988, however, he re-
occupied the land himself. The village officials declined to intervene, and the 
family he evicted became landless once again.  
In the interview, he justifies his unilateral act by appealing both to his 
revolutionary service and to an ethos of hard work. “During the war,” he 
argues, “I paid a tax to the resistance and I aided the liberation front. I 
sacrificed my life for independence and it was unfair to take my land from me. 
I have taken back what belongs to me.” The land, moreover, he says, is 
already under cultivation in rice and cucumbers, as if to further solidify his 
claim. As for the peasant he displaced, he says dismissively, “there are plenty 
of more lands that can be cleared.”  
 
Example 2: Ben Tre Province (Source: Tuoi Tre Newspaper) 
An Hiep commune, Ben Tre province, as profiled in Tuoi Tre newspaper in 
the fall of 1988 (TT 11/26/1988), had initially been at the forefront of the 
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collectivization movement; when a collective farm was created there in 1979, 
95% of the households in the area participated. In 1982, however, land was 
redistributed to individual households on an egalitarian basis; not only were 
total holdings apportioned on the basis of household size, but the individual 
plots were allocated through the drawing of lots, to ensure that no one family 
was favored with better quality or more easily accessible land. Because of this 
egalitarian reform, however, production land was “mixed up” (xao canh) 
between families, and people were “working the land of others” (canh tac 
ruong cua nguoi khac). 
In 1988, farmers began requesting their old land back, and hundreds 
protested at the Commune People’s Committee office to demand the 
restitution of their former holdings (keo len uy ban xa xin ve dat cu). The local 
government eventually acquiesced to their demands, but the resolution of 
these land claims left 15 households in the commune without any land to 
farm. To rectify this situation, the commune arranged for their re-location to 
the province of Dong Thap, in the Plain of Reeds, where land could still be 
cleared and settled, promising them 5,000 to 7,000 square meters per person.  
 
Example 3: Binh Chanh, Ho Chi Minh City (Source: Tuoi Tre Newspaper) 
Emboldened by news that the government in neighboring Long An province 
was returning land to its former owners, farmers in Binh Chanh, a rural 
commune on the southwestern edge of Ho Chi Minh City, began demanding 
the restitution of their former plots in the summer of 1988 (TT 7/12/1988). In 
total, 108 farmers filed petitions to reclaim land, while 19 former land owners 
simply seized their old plots. Local officials intervened to mediate these 
disputes, convincing eight beneficiaries of the readjustment campaigns to 
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return their plots to former owners because they “were not making a good 
living,” and were in arrears to the commune government over taxes and 
missed quotas. In total, these eight households returned a total of 1.63 hectares 
of agricultural land to former owners, who were characterized as “good 
producers.”  
One of these middle peasant petitioners, Mr. Nguyen Van Hai, is profiled 
at length in Tuoi Tre. Hai owned more than 6.5 hectares before 1975, but was 
forced to surrender all but 1.7 hectares under the redistribution campaigns. 
While this still left him and his family substantially above the average per-
capita land ownership in the commune, he instead decided to re-occupy an 
additional 1.3 hectares, now cultivated by three families. With the intervention 
of the commune authorities, it was decided to split the disputed land between 
Hai and its current cultivators; special consideration was given to Hai’s claim, 
the newspaper states, because he “is a good farmer, and has served as a 
exemplar for others for quite some time, and always fulfills his obligation to 
the nation in a straightforward manner.”  
In a separate interview, a local official explains that, “if we continue to 
distribute the land in an equal manner, like we did before, everyone will be 
poor, everyone will lack work.” A “household that can farm well can, by 
itself, cultivate 2-3 hectares of double-cropped rice per year,” and thus the 
policy of the local government is to “encourage those who are not skilled at 
rice farming to transfer their land back to those who know how to farm” (TT 
6/25/1988).  
 
Example 4: Hau Giang Province (Source: Thanh Nien Newspaper) 
In the fall of 1988, reporters from Thanh Nien newspaper accompanied Party 
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Secretary Le Phuoc Tho, a top government official tasked with resolving land 
disputes in the Mekong Delta, to Phuoc Thoi commune in Hau Giang 
province, where they gathered the stories of middle peasant land petitioners. 
Many in the area had been forced to surrender 75 to 80% of their land 
holdings in the redistribution campaigns of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
and many were now demanding their return; by November 1988, 285 petitions 
had been submitted by former owners, 95 of whom had directly re-occupied 
their former holdings without waiting for a resolution of their claims (TN 
11/21/1988).  
One farmer, a Mr. Nguyen Van Du, cited revolutionary service in support 
of his petition for land restitution, arguing that his “family sacrificed two 
people and our home was destroyed in the war, and once liberation was 
accomplished we stood at the head of every campaign.” Now, however, his 
2.1 hectare holding had been whittled down in successive redistributions to 
only 0.88 hectares, which was “not enough even to eat.” Another farmer, Mr. 
Nguyen Van Thong, lost a little over a half a hectare of land, which was 
redistributed to a “drunk,” whose harvests failed and who eventually fell 
behind in his quota obligations before (informally) renting the land to another 
person.  
As farmer Tran Van Hai explains, the middle peasant petitioners “only had 
a few thousand square meters; there was no excess of land.” While “capitalists 
in the cities have big houses and cars,” he argues, “farmers just have land, the 
means of production.” He goes on to explain that he and his fellow middle 
peasants “just want to have our land returned to us. If we need to make 
allowances for the poor or for veterans and invalids, fine, but absolutely not 
for those people who sell the land” or fail to cultivate it. 
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Example 5: An Giang Province (Source: Trung Dinh Dang) 
In Trung Dinh Dang’s (2007) case study area of Cho Moi district, An Giang 
province, the late 1980s are still known as the “great turmoil” (dao lon); after 
Resolution 10 was issued in 1988, former owners rushed to claim their old 
lands, some negotiating with current cultivators, others simply seizing land 
and sowing new rice crops on it, and others gathering at the commune and 
district offices to make their case to local officials. As one former owner, who 
had cultivated 6 hectares before 1975, recalled, “after reunification, 
revolutionary authorities took all my land to redistribute to others. They took 
my land right out of my hands” (Dang 2007:308). Now, however, he had the 
“chance to take it back.” After the authorities rejected his initial request for 
land restitution, he explains, “I decided to break the law; my two brothers and 
I brought them machetes to the field to work. I said that if he [the hamlet 
chief] came to the field, we would kill him. I said that it was right for the 
authorities to take abandoned land but not right to steal land from people” 
(Dang 2007:308). With the intervention of the hamlet chief, he soon regained 
his former holdings.  
Despite the threat of violence, however, many land reform beneficiaries 
whom Trung Dinh Dang interviewed returned land out of an apparent 
deference to the “rights of individual land ownership and values of justice” 
(2007:308). In the words of one landless laborer, who returned a parcel of 
land to its former owner in 1988, “the land had to be returned to its owner. It 
was odd to take another person's land. Everyone did the same. If we were 
poor, we accepted that; we should not steal someone else's land (giut dat 
nguoi khac) to make a living” (Dang 2007:309).  
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By the late summer and early fall of 1988, these local conflicts over land had 
been scaled up to the level of national politics, culminating in two marches in Ho Chi 
Minh City, in which hundreds of middle peasant protestors from the Mekong Delta 
engaged in an unprecedented display of overt political protest, aimed at pressuring 
representatives of the central government into intervening on their behalf in local land 
disputes (Doan Ket 1988:44; Hiebert 1989:19; SGGP 11/11/88). These manifestations 
of middle peasant discontent, moreover, came at a time of similarly unprecedented 
contestation and mobilization within the Vietnamese political sphere, as a “creeping 
pluralism” pushed the boundaries of the one-party model (Porter 1993). At the same 
time the Mekong Delta’s middle peasants were taking to the street, an intra-party 
battle over the direction and pace of reform was breaking into the public realm, 
leading to the emergence of external pressure groups, independent of the communist 
establishment, which aimed to influence the policy debate. The most notable of these 
(ultimately short-lived) groups was the “Club of Former Resistance Fighters” (Cau lac 
bo Nhung Nguoi Khang chien cu). Comprised of NLF veterans from the former South 
Vietnam, the Club pushed for economic reforms and more political openness (Abuza 
2001:161-182), making common cause with both party officials, including the 
reformer Vo Van Kiet, and with the middle peasant protesters, to whom they lent 
organizational and moral support (Wain 1989; Thayer 1992).  
The mere fact that such open protests were not immediately suppressed itself 
points to the emergence of a tentative alliance between party reformers, organized 
veterans, and the restive middle peasantry, forming what Ravallion and van de Walle 
(2008:177) have dubbed a “pro-reform coalition.” The combination of middle peasant 
pressure and converging political interests resulted, eventually, in the promulgation of 
a specific set of reforms, contained within a policy document known as Directive 47, 
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which was applicable only to the Mekong Delta and which called for the restitution of 
land, in most cases, to its former owners. Such a move, in the language of the decree, 
would form the first step towards the ultimate reorganization of agricultural 
production in the Mekong Delta “along the line of intensive cultivation, 
multicropping” and “comprehensive business development” (FBIS 11/15/1988).  
In official rhetoric, this decision to side with the middle peasant was framed in 
a way which justified inequalities in both outcomes and in initial land endowments by 
reference to “hard work” and productive capacity. While General Secretary Linh 
described agricultural reform as encouraging “farmers to make full use of their 
capacity … to develop production and to both increase output for society and raise 
their own incomes,” he acknowledged that doing so would produce “some households 
that are well off, and which have a standard of living which is higher than other 
households" (BHG 4/20/88). In the spring of 1989, a local newspaper in the Mekong 
Delta articulated a similar argument in relation to land allocation, editorializing that 
there was no need to “jealously guard equality between households,” since it was only 
fair for households that were “diligent in their work” be allocated more than “those 
who are lazy” (BHG 4/12/1989). 
 
Implications: From Moral Economy to Political-Economic Divergence 
As I have argued above, historical patterns of settlement, relations of production, and 
experiences of political struggle led to the formation and articulation of a distinct 
moral economy in the Mekong Delta, rooted in the experience of the Delta’s former 
tenants, or “new” middle peasants. This particular moral economy, and the 
restitutional movement it engendered, was unique within Vietnam, leading to a far 
different process of land privatization than prevailed elsewhere in the country. This 
difference in the initial distribution had, in turn, profound implications for the 
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direction of economic and social development in the region during the 1990s and early 
2000s, leading to sharp divergences between the Mekong Delta and similar 
agricultural areas, such as the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam.  
Though the resolution of land disputes in the Mekong Delta took several years, 
concluding only in the mid-1990s, disputes were generally resolved in the favor of 
previous (pre-1975) owners (Lam Quang Huyen 1997:175), in line with official 
policies outlined in Decree 47. Field work by Le Coq and Trebuil (2005:537) in Hau 
Giang province confirms that “land was redistributed to farmers according to the land 
ownership situation before collectivization,” conforming roughly to distribution which 
prevailed after the “land to the tiller” reforms of the early 1970s, while work by Luong 
Hong Quang (1997:116-122) in Tien Giang finds a similar pattern of restitution. As 
one upper-middle peasant in An Giang recalled to Trung Dinh Dang, “thanks to Mr. 
Linh, I could retrieve half of my land [or about 10 out of 20 hectares] and a plowing 
machine. I was very happy when I took it back. People should worship Mr. Linh!” 
(2007:309). 
In the Mekong Delta, the consequence of restitutional policies – in conjunction 
with the loosening of restraints on the private ownership and trade of not just land, but 
other agricultural inputs and outputs – was to prompt the rapid re-emergence of a 
stratum of commercial farmers, setting the scene for a new wave of accumulation 
within the agricultural sector. In An Giang and Hau Giang provinces, it was reported 
that, by late 1988 “many farmers” were farming plots of 10 hectares or more (BHG 
12/21/1988 and 1/18/89) and similar re-accumulation was reported as well in Long 
An, where some farmers received up to 9 hectares of restituted land (Luong 
1994:102). Many of these larger farmers already had substantial mechanized inputs at 
their disposal, and in the areas where the means of production had been collectivized, 
the dissolution of agricultural cooperatives often meant that their productive stock – 
  32 
tractors and other farm implements – were sold at auction to the highest bidder, 
allowing the relatively well-off to complement their land holdings with other factors 
of production and to cement their social and economic position.  
By 1993, nearly half of farming households in the Mekong Delta were 
producing exclusively (or almost exclusively) for the market (Dao The Tuan 1997). 
The process of land privatization led, however, not only led to the creation of a new 
class of upwardly mobile owner-operators, but also to the rapid re-emergence of a 
stratum of landless and land-poor rural workers (Nguyen Dinh Huong 1999:130). 
Survey data collected in 1992-1993 (as part of the first iteration of the Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey), shows that the rate of landlessness in the Mekong Delta already 
stood at approximately 16%, while the Gini index for agricultural land ownership was 
0.51, among the highest in Vietnam (Brandt et al. 2006:Table 5).5 Not only did the 
region demonstrate significant polarization in land ownership, but it also had the 
highest level of reported income inequality of any in Vietnam, and the highest level of 
food insecurity (Dao The Tuan 1997). Thus, social polarization is evident even at a 
very early stage after the resolution of land disputes, a sign that it derived not from the 
unleashing of “market forces,” but from the process by which land and other assets 
were allocated.  
These inequalities intensified in the post reform period, as those middle and 
upper-middle peasants endowed with the “resources with which to respond to 
favorable market conditions” were able to expand and accumulate (Ngo Vinh Long 
1993:184; Dang Phong 1995). As Beresford and Prota (2012) argue, access to land has 
been a necessary, but not sufficient, means of achieving upward social mobility among 
                                                 
5 These figures do not, moreover, capture the large number of poor peasants dispossessed in their 
villages of origin and relocated by provincial governments to remote areas on the agricultural frontier, 
namely the Plain of Reeds in Dong Thap province. According to Hy Van Luong (1994: 102), as many 
of 400 landless households were relocated to Dong Thap from one small area of Long An province. 
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peasant producers in the Mekong Delta; those who were not allocated land in the 
privatization process (or had their holdings taken away from them for restitution to 
former owners), they find, were far more likely than their counterparts to experience 
negative social mobility. Among those who experienced partial, but not complete 
dispossession as a result of the restitution process, the results have been similar. As Le 
Coq and Trebuil (2005:539) find, those who entered the 1990s with very small 
holdings encountered difficulties in achieving financial viability and in competing 
with their larger counterparts, eventually leading to a spiral of debt and distress sale, 
thus accelerating the trend of accumulation and swelling the ranks of the landless. By 
the 2000s, the landless accounted for over 25% of the rural population, and largely 
derived their income from precarious seasonal employment on commercial farms 
(Brandt et al. 2006:Table 5). 
In other regions of Vietnam, most notably the Red River Delta in the north, the 
land privatization process was instead much more highly egalitarian, due in part to the 
mobilization of peasants around a very different moral economy of property. In the 
Red River Delta, local authorities initially attempted, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, to induce greater productivity in agriculture through an auction-based land 
allocation process which would favor better-off households. Such efforts, however, 
were resisted by the ranks of the poor and lower-middle peasants, who through 
complaints and collective pressure induced local cadres to adopt a more egalitarian, 
per capita distribution strategy (Dang Canh Khanh 1991:348). Ngo Vinh Long 
(1993:198), for example, describes how “peasants refused to allow wealthy 
households to bid for contracts on even the most infertile land on the grounds that 
doing so would aid the rich and thereby ‘violate the principles of social justice.’”  
The consequence of such collective pressure was to create an egalitarian land 
distribution which entrenched within the agrarian social structure of northern Vietnam 
  34 
a broad stratum of extremely small-scale, lower-middle peasant farmers, most of 
whom cultivated plots totaling half a hectare or less (Ngo Vinh Long 1993:183). 
Concerns over distributional equity so trumped questions of efficiency during the 
allocation process that land was classified and ranked by quality, proximity, and grade, 
with each household receiving an equivalent mix of land types. The end result of this 
process, however, was the extreme parcelization and dispersal of already small 
holdings, which thus constrained the mechanization and commercialization of 
agriculture over the 1990s and 2000s.  
Rather than being thrust into increasingly capitalist relations of agricultural 
production, as were their counterparts in the south, nearly all farming households in 
the Red River Delta thus entered the post-reform period with at least a small amount 
of agricultural land “capable of providing even the poorest with a modicum of 
economic security and a sort of subsistence safety net” during a time of upheaval and 
uncertainty (Watts 1998:483). For example, a 1993 survey of several provinces in the 
region shows that the vast majority of peasant households (about 70%) were either 
producing at a subsistence level (that is, producing enough to meet household needs) 
or were slightly above the subsistence level and marketing a small surplus (Dao The 
Tuan 1997:158-159). The same survey data also shows minimal income inequality and 
extremely low food insecurity, demonstrating a low degree of social polarization in 
other aspects of production and distribution. As Rambo and Le (1991:88-91) put it, 
“farmers will not get rich from these lands, but at least they are guaranteed a source of 
livelihood that more or less adequately provides for their family’s sustenance.” In 
sharp contrast to the Mekong Delta, the bifurcation of agrarian classes into large-scale 
producers and agrarian wage laborers has been virtually non-existent in the Red River 
Delta. For example, Luong (2010:223-224) reports that in his study site in Phu Tho 
province, no “villager had to rely exclusively or primarily on selling his/her labor to 
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agricultural employers,” since farmers were instead “guaranteed some land for their 
livelihood.” 
 
Conclusion 
What I have provided above is an account of how particular moral economies are 
shaped by historical relations of settlement, production, and political struggle, and 
how these moral economies in turn foster collective social action, rendering it 
meaningful to individual participants and directing it towards certain ends. In doing 
so, I have hewn closely to Thompson’s original formulation of the “moral economy,” 
drawing as well on Wolford’s examination of moral economy in its relation to agrarian 
movements in contemporary Brazil. In particular, I have followed Wolford in 
conceptualizing “moral economy” as the “moral arguments,” embedded in particular 
histories and social relations, that are used by groups to make claims to productive 
resources and outline the ideal distribution of those resources.  
By tracing the origins and articulation of a particular moral economy of 
property, one situated within the experiences of the Mekong Delta’s middle peasants, I 
have identified one of the key factors behind that region’s emergence as a center of 
commercial agriculture and its divergence from other regions, such as the Red River 
Delta. In drawing this comparison between the process of land privatization in the 
Mekong and Red River Deltas, I have also highlighted the interplay between moral 
economy and political economy. While research (Hy Van Luong 2010; Sikor 2004; 
McElwee 2007) suggests that normative commitments to egalitarianism, risk 
minimization, and reciprocal obligation are widely held in northern Vietnamese 
communities, and that these commitments have helped re-create a peasant form of 
subsistence-oriented agriculture in this region, the existence of a very different moral 
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economy in the Mekong Delta has instead given rise to a more skewed distribution of 
land, and thus laid the groundwork for the rapid re-emergence of agrarian capitalism.  
The divergence between north and south, and the particular path which the 
Mekong Delta has taken towards technologically-intensive, large-scale export 
agriculture, are thus rooted not in the imposition of “markets” per se, but in the 
structural and normative landscape in which market reforms have been interpreted, 
contested, and implemented. In this way, the conflicts over land which occurred in the 
Mekong Delta during the late 1980s did not just help to create the material conditions 
for agrarian capitalism, but the normative and ideational conditions under which it 
could thrive. By ensuring the restitution of land to its former owners, the middle 
peasants, and by cementing a particular moral economy of property within the political 
economy of the Mekong Delta, these conflicts helped to entrench neo-liberal notions 
that land rightly belongs to those who can most effectively till it, and to shape the 
state’s role as the protector of property rights, rather than the guarantor of a 
subsistence minimum. Thus, the moral economy of property which I have discussed 
above provided the foundation upon which a new set of neo-liberal economic relations 
have been articulated in the post-reform period.  
Though this study has focused on the land conflicts of the late 1980s, the land 
question is as urgent now as it was then, and conflicting notions of distributive justice 
are once again being brought to the fore of Vietnamese politics. Titles to agricultural 
land in Vietnam are governed by the 1993 Land Law, but are valid only for 20 years, 
and thus will soon begin to expire. As of yet, the precise way in which this issue will 
be resolved remains unclear, but two outcomes are possible: either current land 
ownership rights will be extended, essentially converting them to permanent tenure, or 
the state will exercise its legal prerogative and attempt to alleviate growing 
inequalities through some form of land redistribution. The stage is thus set for a new 
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round of conflict and protest around land issues, and though much has changed in 
Vietnam over the past two decades, one can be certain that groups will mobilize 
around shared notions of distributive justice to make moral arguments about land 
ownership and use, just as they did in the 1980s. Then as now, moral economy will 
shape the terrain upon which new forms of political economy are contested and 
constructed, and significant regional differences in moral economy may once again 
lead to the uneven application of policy and to increasingly divergent trajectories of 
socio-economic development.  
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APPENDIX I: MAPS OF VIETNAM 
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APPENDIX II: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS 
1862:  Establishment of French colony (Cochinchina) in Southern Vietnam. 
1927:   Ninh Thanh Loi uprising. 
1930-1931:  Depression-era protests and land occupations across the Mekong Delta. 
1945-1954:  First Indochina War pits the French against the Viet Minh insurgency.  
Land reforms carried out in areas of Viet Minh control. 
1954:   Independence and partition. Ngo Dinh Diem assumes presidency of 
South Vietnam.  
1960:   National Liberation Front formed to coordinate anti-Diem insurgency 
in South Vietnam. Land reform efforts in “liberated areas” begin and 
persist for the duration of the war.  
1963:  Diem assassinated.   
1964:   Tonkin Gulf Resolution, escalation of U.S. troop commitment. 
1965:  Nguyen Van Thieu assumes presidency of South Vietnam. 
1968:   Tet Offensive.  
1970-1973:  South Vietnamese government implements “Land to the Tiller” 
reforms. 
1975:  End of hostilities, reunification of Vietnam under communist control. 
1976-1979:  Vietnamese government launches first round of land redistribution in 
the south, targeting landlords and collaborators. 
1982-1984:  Second wave of redistributive reform targets land holdings of middle 
and upper peasants, which are allocated to the landless and rural poor.  
1986:  Doi Moi (“renovation”) policy of economic reform launched at the 
Sixth National Conference of the Vietnamese Communist Party. 
Nguyen Van Linh ascends to position of General Secretary.  
03/1988:   Vo Van Kiet becomes acting Prime Minister.  
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04/1988:    “Resolution 10” reforms in the agricultural sector announced, marking 
the formal return of private land tenure.  
04-08/1988:  Protests over land erupt in the Mekong Delta, culminating in march of 
middle peasants on Ho Chi Minh City in mid-August.  
08/1988:    Central Committee issues “Directive 47” in late August, calling for 
restitution of land to former owners in the Mekong Delta.  
11/1988:    Second march of middle peasants on Ho Chi Minh City. Party 
leadership chides local officials for slow pace of land restitution in the 
Mekong Delta.  
1993:   New land law cements the long-term rights of those allocated land in 
the decollectivization process.  These rights are re-affirmed and 
broadened by revisions to the land law in 2003.    
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